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What Prompts Central Bank Intervention in the Barbadian Foreign 
Exchange Market? 
By Mahalia Jackman* 
Abstract 
The Central Bank of Barbados often intervenes – buys or sells from the foreign exchange 
(FX) reserves – to ensure the daily clearing of the FX market. This paper estimates an FX 
intervention function for Barbados using a dynamic complementary log-log model. Three 
general findings emerged: (i) dynamics play an important role in the Central Bank’s 
intervention function, meaning that the probability that an intervention takes place today 
is conditional upon an intervention taking place at least one day prior. This most likely 
reflects the fact that deficits/surpluses on the FX market tend to be persistent, resulting in 
intervention over a consecutive number of days; (ii) there appears to be some differences 
in the response of Central Bank interventions to the other key variables. Particularly, 
seasonal fluctuations in tourism and interest rate spreads are likely to impact the 
probability of a sale intervention, but don’t seem to affect the likelihood of a purchase 
intervention. Moreover, an influx of real estate flows is likely to increase the probability 
that a purchase intervention takes place, but might have limited impact on the marginal 
propensity of a sale intervention. Finally, (iii) ‘oil price shocks’ is the only exogenous 
variable which appears to impact both sale and purchase interventions. 
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Introduction 
Intervention in the foreign exchange (FX) market occurs when a monetary authority buys 
or sells foreign dollars, normally against its own currency. Central banks usually intervene 
in order to calm disorderly market conditions, fix exchange rate misalignments, stabilise 
erratic short-term exchange rate fluctuations, or quell the excess demand/supply of FX. It 
follows that the motivation, frequency and size of interventions vary considerably across 
exchange rate regimes. 
 
Under a floating regime, the size and timing of interventions are critical policy decisions. 
Specifically, the magnitude of the intervention is assumed to be proportional to the 
resulting change in the exchange rate, while the timing determines whether or not the 
shock is fully absorbed by market players1. But, in an economy with a fixed exchange rate – 
                                                        
 
* Ms. Mahalia Jackman is a Senior Economist in the Research and Economic Analysis Department of the Central Bank of 
Barbados. 
1 Theoretically, the more surprising the intervention, the more likely market players will be caught off guard. If intervention 
is unexpected, market players may not be able to fully absorb the shock and so, intervention is more effective. 
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such as Barbados – it is the FX demand and supply conditions that dictate both the timing 
and amount of intervention. Hence, intervention in a pegged economy tends to be 
endogenous. 
 
Figure 1 depicts a simplified model of the intervention process in Barbados2. The focus 
here (as well as the rest of the paper) is on the interaction between the Central Bank and 
authorised FX dealers. Typically, if any FX dealer has more FX than it needs, it offers to sell 
the surplus on the market. Dealers who are short that day, or expect to experience a 
shortage over the next couple of days, buy from the surplus player. If the short dealers 
don’t need the full amount on offer, the excess surplus is sold to the Central Bank. 
Alternatively, if the offered amount by surplus players is insufficient, the dealers whose 
needs cannot be met on the interbank market are accommodated by the Central Bank. In a 
nutshell, the Central Bank acts as the last resort for sales and purchases of FX, and only 
intervenes in periods of excess deficits or surpluses. 
 
 
Figure 1: FX Intervention in Barbados 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This then raises the question – “what are the causes of FX deficits/surpluses in the 
Barbados FX market?”  In this paper, the author seeks to unravel some of the factors that 
force Central Bank involvement in the Barbados FX market. The study employs daily data, 
and in so doing, better captures the frequency and pattern of FX intervention with respect 
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to balancing demand and supply in the market. The disadvantage of this approach is the 
vanishing relationship between interventions and some “economic fundamentals” which 
are usually measured on a monthly or quarterly basis (see Almekinders and Eijfinfer, 
1994).  
 
The rest of this paper is organised as follows: in Section 1, an analysis of the features of 
central bank intervention is presented. Section 2 evaluates some factors believed to be 
driving intervention, while section 3 presents and evaluates a quantitative model of FX 
intervention for Barbados. Finally, some concluding remarks are offered in section 4. 
 
 
1. Features of FX Interventions in Barbados  
1.1. Measuring FX Interventions 
A popular proxy of intervention is the change in the stock of international reserves. 
However, the use of this variable for Barbados can be very misleading, since changes in 
reserves often reflect, inter alia, withdrawals/inflows of funds from multilateral 
organisations (for instance, the Caribbean Development Bank or the Inter-American 
Development Bank), government repayments and inflows from government loans. Thus, 
official intervention in this paper is defined as the total foreign currencies traded by the 
Central Bank on the interbank FX market. 
 
But, even this approach has its shortcomings. Specifically, FX dealers in Barbados are 
currently subjected to two surrender requirements (see Worrell et al, 2011): 
 
I. FX dealers in Barbados are required to sell 25 percent of the proceeds of foreign 
currency loans undertaken on behalf of private sector customers and 100 
percent of the proceeds of government related loans to the Central Bank 
(effective 2005). 
II. Dealers are required to sell 5 percent of their gross purchases of FX from their 
customers to the Central Bank (effective 2011). 
 
In this study, the author excludes purchases relating to these FX policies from the definition 
of “buy interventions” as they may not necessarily reflect intervention driven by 
supply/demand conditions, i.e. a sale to the Central Bank due to a surplus of FX on the 
market. Thus defined, the remainder of this section focuses on the prominent features of FX 
interventions over the period 2003-2011. 
 
 
1.2. Size, Frequency and Structure of FX Interventions in Barbados 
Daily FX interventions carried out by the Central Bank are mostly denoted in US dollars 
(See figure 2) – which can be expected given that the aim is to defend the BDS$2 to US$1 
peg. Trailing behind are trades of regional currencies, i.e. transactions in Belize, Eastern 
Caribbean, Guyanese, Jamaican or Trinidad and Tobago dollars. A close look at the data  
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reveals that the majority of transactions in regional currencies are related to trade in 
goods. Indeed, the majority of Barbados’ visible trade is with CARICOM countries. Intra-
regional financial and capital transactions also occur, but are not quite as common; and 
most of these tend to take place in US dollars. Finally, there are occasional sales of Canadian 
dollars (CAN), Sterling pounds (STG) and Euros, which tend to be largely related to the 
importation of goods and proceeds of property sales. As shown in Figure 2, purchases of 
these currencies are rare, accounting for less than 3 percent of daily FX transactions on 
average. 
 
Figure 1: Intervention by Currency – Daily Average: 2003-2011 
 
Source: Central Bank of Barbados 
 
Table 1 describes the empirical distribution of the intervention data over the sample 
period. The table highlights that Central Bank FX interventions are heavily skewed, and 
exhibit larger kurtosis than the normal distribution. In fact, the Jarque-Bera statistic 
unambiguously rejects the null hypothesis of normality for both sale and purchase 
interventions. 
 
There seems to be a preponderance of days of zero activity. Out of 2,348 trading days, sale 
interventions take on a zero value in 260 business days. The case of purchase interventions 
is even more dramatic, registering 495 days with no activity. The dollar amounts of FX 
interventions tend to be small, at least in comparison to the more advanced economies (see 
for instance Kim and Sheen, 2002; Frenkel and Stadtman, 2001); the average sale 
intervention for the full sample being $1.2 million and the average purchase value is just 
$0.8 million. Moreover, on nearly 70 percent of active days, the intensity of sale 
interventions are less than $1 million, while about 67 percent of purchase interventions 
stood in the modest range of $0 to $1 million. Nonetheless, there are episodes of large scale 
interventions, with the largest sale and purchase interventions to date valued at $34 
million and $96.4 million, respectively. 
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Table 1: Empirical Distribution of Interventions – January 2003 to December 2011 
 
Sale Interventions Purchase Interventions 
Intervention 
Value (BDS $M) 
Frequency 
Cumulative 
(%) 
Intervention Value 
(BDS $M) 
Frequency Cumulative (%) 
0 260 11.1 0 495 21.1 
(0.0 – 0.5] 1489 74.5 (0.0 – 0.5] 1381 79.9 
(0.5 – 1.0] 150 80.9 (0.5 – 1.0] 182 87.6 
(1.0 – 1.5] 71 83.9 (1.0 – 1.5] 52 89.9 
(1.5 – 2.0] 49 86.0 (1.5 – 2.0] 36 91.4 
(2.0 – 2.5] 44 87.9 (2.0 – 2.5] 42 93.2 
(2.5 – 3.0] 36 89.4 (2.5 – 3.0] 37 94.8 
(3.0 – 3.5] 33 90.8 (3.0 – 3.5] 18 95.5 
(3.5 – 4.0] 20 91.7 (3.5 – 4.0] 6 95.8 
(4.0 – 4.5] 16 92.3 (4.0 – 4.5] 12 96.3 
(4.5 – 5.0] 14 92.9 (4.5 – 5.0] 3 96.4 
> 5.0 166 100.0 > 5.0 84 100.0 
  Sales Purchases 
  
  
Mean $1.2M $0.8M 
  
  
Maximum $34.0M $96.4M 
  
  
Jarque-Bera (p-value) 73179.02 [0.0] 8401276 [0.0] 
  
  
Skewness 4.5 13.9 
  
  
Kurtosis 28.8 294.7       
Source: Central Bank of Barbados and author’s calculations 
 
Interestingly, the intervention size and frequency was not uniform over the sample period. 
This is shown in Figures 3 and 4, which plot the average daily intervention value and the 
relative frequency of interventions (defined as percentage of trading days with 
intervention activity). Between 2003 and 2007, both the frequency and size of sale 
interventions were on a downward trajectory, with the frequency of sales intervention 
moving from 0.95 in 2004 to 0.86 in 2007. The size of daily sales (on average) also fell, 
moving from $2.4 million to a low of $0.3 million. But, it should be noted that the year 2007 
is a large outlier here. Specifically, the observed decline in FX obtained from the Central 
Bank may have been due to the influx of foreign flows in relation to Cricket World Cup 
2007 as well as the inflows due to the purchase of local BS&T shares by Neal & Massy. As 
shown in Figure 4, this led to resurgence in sales of FX to the Central Bank. In fact, over the 
time period, 2007 is the only year in which the difference between average daily purchases 
and sales was positive. 
 
Beyond 2007, i.e. since the onset of the crisis, both the size and frequency of purchase 
interventions (net of the surrender requirements) have been on the decline. This was 
somewhat expected, as some of the key features of the crisis were declining travel receipts 
and diminished capital and financial inflows. However, in 2011, the average daily purchase 
intervention rebounded, as there was an influx of flows relating to the sale of Barbados 
Light and Power shares to Emera. At the same time, the size of sale interventions rose, 
returning to 2004-2006 levels. Interestingly, the percentage of days with activity remained 
low, as Central Bank mainly received large discrete demands for FX. 
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Figure 3: Size and Relative Frequency of Sale Interventions 
 
Source: Central Bank of Barbados and author’s calculations 
 
Figure 4:  Size and Relative Frequency of Purchase Interventions 
 
Source: Central Bank of Barbados and author’s calculations 
 
2. Factors Influencing FX Intervention in Barbados 
As mentioned in the introduction, in a fixed rate regime, it is the supply and demand 
conditions on the FX market that prompt central bank intervention. Thus, the Central Bank 
ensures the daily clearing of the market by buying and selling from its international 
reserves. This section examines some of the factors that may prompt intervention.  
 
The market clearing condition may be written as: 
                       (1) 
0.00
0.10
0.20
0.30
0.40
0.50
0.60
0.70
0.80
0.90
1.00
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
B
D
S
 $
M
 
Relative Frequency of  Sale Interventions (right axis) Average Daily Sale Intervention (left axis)
Crisis 
0.00
0.10
0.20
0.30
0.40
0.50
0.60
0.70
0.80
0.90
1.00
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
B
D
S
 $
M
 
Relative Frequency of Purchase Interventions (right axis) Average Daily Purchase Intervention (left axis)
Crisis 
7 
 
where              denotes the foreign currency flows generating from central bank 
intervention in the market,    represents flows generated by current account transactions 
and    is the net flow demand for domestic currency through the capital and financial 
account of the balance of payments. 
 
Traditionally, the current account is assumed to be a function of measures of price 
competitiveness such as the real exchange rate (Sarno & Taylor, 2001). But Barbados 
accounts for such a small volume of trade in its import and export markets that it has very 
little influence in determining the prices of the products it trades (Witter, Briguglio, & 
Bhuglah, 2002) – in other words, Barbados can be described as a price taker. Limited price 
control and small shares imply that the balance on the current account tends to be 
externally determined. At present, the current account balance is  determined by the price 
of international oil and tourism flows.  
 
Barbados, like several other Caribbean states, is a net importer of oil. As noted by Moore 
(2011), oil-related imports currently account for over 20 percent of total imports, and so, 
stands as the largest component of imports. As a price taker, the escalating price of oil in 
recent years has inflated the country’s import bill, and by extension, led to a significant 
deterioration in the external current account. As a result, the Central Bank has had to 
intervene to provide FX to cover oil-related payments. It is estimated that between 2006 
and 2011, nearly 50 percent of Central Bank FX sales were for oil related imports. Given 
that the volume of oil imports has generally been on the decline since 2006 (See figure 5), it 
seems as though this development was driven by hikes in the international price of oil. 
Based on Figure 6, there seems to be some correlation between shocks to the price of oil 
and sale interventions. 
 
Figure 5: Volume of Oil Imports and Sale Interventions 
 
Source: Central Bank of Barbados 
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Figure 6: International Oil Prices and Sale Interventions 
 
Source: Central Bank of Barbados and the International Monetary Fund 
 
On the export side, tourism receipts are the country’s main source of external finance, 
accounting for nearly 50 percent of total foreign exchange earnings. In fact, recent work by 
Lorde et al., (2010) suggests that current account deficits in Barbados would be 
unsustainable without tourism receipts. Given the island’s high dependence on tourism, it 
is not surprising that the buoyancy of FX intervention in Barbados is highly seasonal and 
generally moves in tandem with the seasonal fluctuations in tourist arrivals (See figure 7)3. 
 
Figure 7: Seasonal Fluctuations in Net Purchases of FX and Tourist Arrivals 
 
Source: Central Bank of Barbados and author’s calculations 
                                                        
 
3 The seasonal components presented in Figure 7 were extracted using the univariate structural time series model of Harvey 
(1989). 
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The analysis thus far has focused on how factors driving the current account influence FX 
intervention. But, what about   ? At the daily frequency, the change in net demand for 
capital inflows is the main driver of fluctuations in a central bank’s net purchase of foreign 
currencies. In the absence of sufficient capital inflows, the deficit on the external current 
account can only be financed through intervention, whereas an abundance of capital flows 
creates a surplus of FX in the system that ordinarily would be purchased by the central 
bank.   
 
In general, a model of    can be derived within the framework of speculative dynamics  
(Sarno & Taylor, 2001). Under these models, the net demand for foreign currency should 
be related to factors such as the differential between domestic and foreign interest rates. 
Indeed, work by Worrell et al (2008) and Craigwell et al (2011) suggest that once 
allowance is made for market frictions and large discrete events, net purchases of FX by the 
Central Bank responded to interest differentials in a way that was consistent with the 
uncovered interest parity condition – i.e. net purchases of FX were positively related to the 
interest rate spread4. 
 
Another factor influencing   , but less likely to be influenced by the interest rate spread 
dynamics, is real estate flows. As can be seen in Figure 8, these flows make up a significant 
portion of long-term private capital inflows, and should, by extension, influence central 
bank intervention (See figure 9). 
 
Figure 8: Long-Term Private Capital Inflows 
 
Source: Central Bank of Barbados 
 
                                                        
 
4 These studies define the interest rate spread as the difference between the Barbados 3-month Treasury bill rate and that of 
the US. 
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Figure 9: Real Estate Flows and Central Bank Intervention 
 
Source: Central Bank of Barbados 
 
3. Modelling FX Intervention in Barbados 
In this section, a quantitative model of FX intervention is given. Based on the analysis 
presented in Section 2, the author assumes that FX intervention in Barbados can be 
modelled as a function of oil price shocks, tourism, interest rate spreads and real estate 
inflows. But, as noted by Jackman (2012), deficits/surpluses on the Barbados FX market 
tend to be persistent, i.e. once an intervention is carried out, another intervention is likely 
to take place in the following day. Thus, some autoregressive terms are also included in the 
model.  
 
Purchase and sale interventions are modelled individually. Separate models of purchase 
and sale interventions allow us to better capture the region of inaction and the potential 
asymmetric response of purchase and sale interventions to the dependent variables 
(Herrera & Özbay, 2005). The estimated model takes the following form: 
 
   
                    
                (2) 
 
   
               
            (3) 
 
The variable   
         represents a purchase of foreign currency by the Central Bank 
(exclusive of purchases made in relation to the surrender requirements);    
     represents a 
sale of foreign currency,   is the lag operator and         are error terms.     is a matrix of 
control variables such that     (       
          
                
   ) where T is the tourism 
variable,         is the interest differential between Barbados and the US;              
represents real estate flows; and,   
    represents oil price shocks. 
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3.1. Estimation Technique 
The econometric modelling of daily intervention series has been widely discussed in the 
academic literature. As shown in Table 1, the data can be described as a ‘zero-inflated 
process’ – i.e. several observations have a zero value. To overcome this problem, studies 
often consider intervention to be generated from a mixture of three probability 
distributions with non-overlapping sample distributions (Kim & Sheen, 2002), i.e. three 
types of events – positive intervention, negative intervention and zero intervention. This 
then implies that estimations based on simple OLS regression techniques may be severely 
biased. 
 
To address this, some authors generate a binary choice dependent variable corresponding 
to the intervention/no intervention outcomes of sale and purchase interventions, and then 
model the probability of each type of intervention using either probit or logit models (see 
for instance Ballie and Osterber, 1997; Frankel and Stadtman, 2001; Kim and Sheen, 2002). 
Following this approach, the variable   
          takes the value of one if there is a purchase 
of foreign currency– and zero otherwise – and    
     is a dummy variable that takes the 
value of one if there is a sale of foreign currency, and zero otherwise. 
 
But, an issue with using probit/logit estimation is that their density functions are assumed 
to be symmetric about zero. However, as discussed in Section 1, the intervention data is 
heavily skewed. Thus, use of probit/logit models may represent a misspecification and can 
lead to biased inferences about the marginal effect of changes in any of the independent 
variables. As such, this paper utilises a complementary log-log model. Unlike the probit and 
logit models, the log-log function allows for asymmetry, and is derived from the 
assumption that the error distribution (or distribution of the latent variable) follows a 
standard extreme value distribution. Thus, the model is useful in cases where the 
probability of an event is very small or very large, as is the case of the intervention  
variables. 
 
3.2. Data Description 
The foreign exchange intervention information used in this paper is the total currencies 
(i.e. U.S. dollars, Canadian dollars, sterling pounds, Euros and regional currencies) traded 
with FX dealers. As in Worrell et al (2008) and Craigwell et al (2011), the tourism variable 
is a discrete variable used to differentiate between the peak period of tourism and the low 
period; the interest rate spread is defined as the difference between the Barbados 3-month 
Treasury Bill rate and that of the US. The volatility of oil prices is used as a proxy for oil 
price shocks. In general, a GARCH (1, 1) model with a general error distribution gave the 
best approximation of the conditional volatility of oil prices. Data on the US Treasury Bill 
rate is taken from the US Department of the Treasury, while observations on oil prices are 
obtained from the US Energy Information Administration; all other information is taken 
from Central Bank data files. The frequency of the data is daily, spanning the period 
January, 2003 to December, 2011. 
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3.3. Estimated Results 
Maximum likelihood estimates of the dynamic complementary log-log models are 
presented in Tables 2 (purchase interventions) and 3 (sale interventions).   
 
Table 2: Determinants of Purchase Interventions 
  Observed 
Coefficient 
Average Marginal 
Effect 
Robust Standard 
Errors 
P-Value 
  
        
     0.336 0.107 0.065 0.000 
  
        
     0.271 0.086 0.065 0.000 
   0.011 0.004 0.052 0.828 
  
      
 0.384 0.122 0.275 0.162 
  
            2.51e
-08 
7.93 e
-09
 1.05 e
-08
 0.017 
  
    -0.012 -0.004 0.007 0.096 
 
 
Table 3: Determinants of Sale Interventions 
  Observed 
Coefficient 
Average Marginal 
Effect 
Robust Standard 
Errors 
P-Value 
  
         0.281 0.065 0.084 0.001 
   -0.113 -0.027 0.054 0.037 
  
      
 -0.087 -0.021 0.021 0.000 
  
            -6.62e
-08
 -1.56e
-10
 6.74e
-09
 0.922 
  
    0.021 0.005 0.009 0.013 
 
From these results, three general observations can be made:  
 
I. Dynamics play an important role in the Central Bank of Barbados’ FX intervention 
function. Lags of the dependent variable in both purchase and sale equations are 
positive and statistically significant, implying that the probability that an 
intervention takes place today is conditional upon an intervention taking place 
at least one day prior. Ito and Yabu (2007) associate the dynamic correlation of 
interventions with the presence of political costs associated with the process of 
designing an optimal intervention policy. This usually occurs if a central bank 
has to negotiate interventions with a third party. Once an agreement is reached, 
interventions can be carried out over a number of days. Herrera and Özbay 
(2005) posit that temporal correlation can also arise if the objective of the 
central bank is to minimise an intertemporal loss function that is non-time 
separable – i.e., if the central bank wants to minimise the impact of current 
disorder in the FX market, but also past realisations of distortions. But, as 
mentioned in the introduction, the Central Bank (or any other party for that 
matter) does not determine the timing or amount of intervention– it is the 
market that dictates FX intervention. Thus, these aforementioned theories are 
not fully applicable to Barbados. Rather, the apparent positive autocorrelation in 
the FX intervention function most likely reflects the fact that deficits/surpluses 
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on either the capital or current account tend to persist over a number of days. 
These pressures tend to be exerted on the peg over a consecutive number of 
days leading to some persistence in interventions. Interestingly, purchase 
interventions tend to be more persistent than sale interventions – for the 
purchase intervention specification, a lag length of two is found to be most 
useful, while one lag is sufficient for the sale intervention estimation. 
 
II. There are differences in the response of Central Bank purchase and sale 
interventions to FX supply and demand conditions – highlighting the importance of 
modelling “buy” and “sell” interventions separately. Interestingly, the estimated 
results seem to suggest that seasonal fluctuations in tourism do not 
systematically influence purchase interventions (at least at the conventional 
levels of testing), but affects sale interventions. Specifically, during the peak 
tourist season, the Central Bank is less likely to conduct a sale intervention than 
during the off-peak season. This hints that the influx of tourists in specific 
months reduces FX dealers’ dependence on Central Bank and points to the 
importance of tourism receipts in achieving external balance and maintaining 
adequate reserves. A similar story emerges for interest rate spreads – higher 
interest rate spreads may reduce the probability of sale intervention, but has no 
impact on the marginal propensity of a purchase intervention. Finally, the 
coefficient on the real estate variable is positive and significant in the purchase 
intervention specification – signalling that an influx of real estate flows could 
increase the likelihood of the Central Bank purchasing FX from the interbank 
market – but has a limited impact on sale interventions. 
 
III. The impact of oil price shocks is significant and wide-spread. An interesting 
observation is that oil price volatility is the only exogenous variable which is 
statistically significant in both estimations. As shown in Table 3, greater oil price 
volatility increases the possibility of a sale intervention, which is in line with 
Figure 6. At the same time, the shock reduces the chance of a purchase 
intervention. From this, oil prices can be said to have the greatest impact on FX 
intervention as it affects both “buy” and “sell” interventions; on both ends, hikes 
in oil prices result in a loss in reserves. Against this backdrop, the recent push to 
create a green economy and reduce the dependence on fossil fuels seems to be 
justified. In 2011, the Government outlined a renewable energy programme and 
discussed several initiatives to encourage the use of energy efficient machinery 
and processes. More than this, there are plans on stream to retrofit all state-
owned buildings to make them more energy efficient. These efforts are 
forecasted to bring down the cumulative cost of oil imports by about 25 percent 
and total electricity cost by US$200 million over the next 20 years. The shift from 
fossil fuels to renewable forms of energy could be very beneficial. Specifically, it 
can help shield Barbados – to some extent – against future hikes in oil prices. As 
such, this should significantly reduce the import bill and by extension, limit 
international reserve losses. 
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The estimated model can be used to form expectations for Central Bank intervention in 
Barbados. Specifically, if the estimated model holds true, what are the implications for 
Central Bank intervention in 2012? Table 4 below summarises projections for oil prices,  
tourism receipts, interest rate spreads and real estate inflows. 
 
Table 4: Expectations for Oil Prices, Tourism Receipts,  
Interest Rate Spreads and Real Estate Inflows 
 2012forecast Source 
   
Average Price of Crude Oil Increase IMF World Economic Outlook (April, 2012) 
Tourism Receipts Increase World Travel and Tourism Council Database (as at April 2012) 
Interest Rate Spread Largely Unchanged Author’s Expectations 
Real Estate Inflows Steady Inflows Key market players 
 
According to the April 2012 edition of the IMF’s World Economic Outlook, the average price 
of crude oil is forecasted to increase from US$104.01 in 2011 to US$114.70 in 2012, largely 
based on geopolitical risks, which are unlikely to subside soon. As shown in Section 2, 
positive oil price shocks were a leading cause of sale interventions between 2008 and 
2011. Based on the evidence presented in Tables 3 and 4, if oil prices continue to rise, one 
would then expect that the probability of oil-related sale interventions will also increase, 
and that purchase interventions might be negatively affected.  
 
Projections for travel receipts are a bit more favourable. As at April, 2012, estimates from 
the World Travel and Tourism Council (WTTC) indicated that visitor exports for Barbados 
could rise. While the econometric model only looked at how seasonal fluctuations in 
tourism affect sale interventions, it can be inferred that in general, a rise in tourist 
expenditure significantly reduces sale interventions. So, with an uptick in tourist 
expenditure, there may be less dependence on the Central Bank by authorised dealers to 
meet their FX needs.  
 
The forecast for interest spreads is a bit more complex. However, the author expects that 
the accommodative monetary stance held by the Federal Reserve and the Central Bank in 
2011 should continue in 2012 – specifically, no significant changes in interest spread are 
currently expected. Thus, the estimated impact of interest rates spreads on sale 
interventions in 2012 should be marginal. Finally, based largely on discussions with key 
real estate agents in the countries, the outlook for real estate inflows to Barbados is stable – 
which increases the likelihood of purchase interventions this year. 
 
4. Concluding Remarks 
The FX market in Barbados can be described as a “small, fixed price market”. As such, the 
Central Bank does not determine the timing or the amount of intervention, but simply 
intervenes to ensure the daily clearing of the market. This paper evaluates FX intervention 
in Barbados. It applies a dynamic complementary log-log model to determine the factors 
which prompt central bank intervention in the Barbados FX market.    
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Results indicate that past interventions are very useful in predicting current intervention, 
which the author attributes to the fact that imbalances in the FX market tend to persist 
over a number of days. Also, it is found that modelling “sell” and “buy” interventions 
individually allows us to make useful interpretations that have not (to the best of the 
author’s knowledge) been made before for Barbados – i.e. the potential asymmetric 
response of purchase and sale interventions to the independent variables. Specifically, the 
empirical evidence suggests that seasonal fluctuations in tourism and interest rate spreads 
influence the probability of a sale intervention, but don’t seem to affect the likelihood of a 
purchase intervention. Moreover, real estate flows tend to increase the probability that a 
purchase intervention takes place, but has a limited impact on the marginal propensity of a 
sale intervention. This may suggest that studies based on “net” behaviour can conceal 
differences in intervention behaviour. 
 
The paper also looked at the implications of the model for Central Bank intervention in 
2012. Based on the estimated model, oil-related FX interventions should increase in this 
year, as oil prices are currently forecasted to continue to rise in 2012 (see IMF’s World 
Economic Outlook released in April, 2012). Current expectations are that interest rate 
spreads should remain relatively unchanged. Hence, changes in sale interventions brought 
about by movements in the interest rate spread should be negligible. While the model only 
looked at how seasonal fluctuations impact FX interventions, it can be inferred that the 
amount of tourism receipts received in Barbados significantly impacts on sales 
interventions. As at April 2012, the WTTC projects a rise in tourism receipts for Barbados. 
This could bring about some ease in sale interventions. Finally, current forecasts are that 
real estate related inflows should be stable in 2012, and this should increase the chances of 
a purchase intervention. However, it should be noted that these predictions for 
intervention are more indicative than conclusive as they are largely conditional on (1) the 
accuracy of the model5; and (2) the projections for oil prices, tourism receipts, interest rate 
spreads and real estate flow materialising6. 
 
 
References 
Almekinders, G., & Eijffinger, C. (1994), Daily Bundesbank and Federal Reserve Interventions: 
Are they a Reaction to Changes in the Level and Volatility of the DM/$-Rate? Empirical 
Economics, 19, pp. 111-130. 
 
Ballie, R., & Osterberg, W. (1997), Why do Central Banks Intervene? Journal of International 
Money and Finance, 16(6), pp. 909-919. 
 
Craigwell, R., Jackman, M., & Doyle-Lowe, M. (2011), Non-linearity in the Reaction of the 
Foreign Exchange Market to Interest Rate Differentials: Evidence from a Small Open 
                                                        
 
5 A model, being an approximation of a certain reality, will always have some degree of misspecification or inaccuracy. The 
question then is how serious the misspecification or inaccuracy. 
6 The classic truism applies here: even the best forecasts fail. 
16 
 
Economy with a Long-Term Peg, Paper Presented at CCMF Conference, November, 
2011. Forthcoming in Applied Financial Economics. 
 
Frenkel, M., & Stadtman, G. (2001), Intervention Reaction Functions in the Dollar-
Deuthschmark Market, Financial Markets and Portfolio Management, 15(3), pp. 328-
343. 
 
Harvey, A. (1989), Forecasting Structural Time Series Models and the Kalman Filter, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Herrera, A., & Özbay, P. (2005, January), A Dynamic Model of Central Bank Intervention, 
Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey Working Paper 05/01. 
 
Ito, T., & Yabu, T. (2007), What Prompts Japan to Intervene in the Forex Market? A New 
Approach to a Reaction Function, Journal of International Money and Finance, 26, pp. 
193-212. 
 
Jackman, M. (2012), Foreign Exchange Intervention in a Small Open Economy with a Long 
Term Peg, Economics Bulletin, 32, pp. 2207-2219. 
 
Kim, S., & Sheen, J. (2002), The Determinants of Foreign Exchange Intervention by Central 
Banks: Evidence from Australia, Journal of International Money and Finance, 21, pp. 
619-649. 
 
Lorde, T., Lowe, S., & Francis, B. (2010), Do Tourism Receipts Contribute to the Sustainability 
of Current Account Deficits in Barbados? Central Bank of Barbados Working Papers. 
 
Moore, A. (2011), Demand Elasticity of Oil In Barbados, Energy Policy, 39(6), pp. 3515-3519. 
 
Sarno, L., & Taylor, M. (2001, September), Official Intervention in the Foreign Exchange 
Market: Is it Effective and, If so, How Does it Work? Journal of Economic Literature, 
XXXIX, pp. 839-868. 
 
Witter, M., Briguglio, L., & Bhuglah, A. (2002, May 9-10), Measuring and Managing the 
Economic Vulnerability of Small Island Developing States, Montego Bay, Jamaica. 
 
Worrell, D., Craigwell, R., & Mitchell, T. (2008), The Behaviour of a Small Exchange Market 
with a Long Term Peg: Barbados, Applied Financial Economics, 19(8), pp. 673-682. 
 
Worrell, D., Doyle-Lowe, M., & Jackman, M. (2011, June), An Analysis of Central Bank 
Intervention in the Barbadian Foreign Exchange Market, Central Bank of Barbados 
Economic Review, pp. 46-54 
 
